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JOSHUA MEYROWITZ 
 
 
 TV Politics: Seeing More than We Want, 
 Knowing Less than We Need 
 
 
 How is it that the public and the press have come to have so little 
faith in, and to feel so little in awe of, our national leaders and the 
political process in general? Why do we citizens feel that we know too 
much about politicians' personal lives ─ their families, their failings, 
their affairs, even what type of underwear they prefer ─ while, at the 
same time, we sense we are being told too little about significant social 
issues? 
 This essay offers two different answers to these questions. Neither 
answer, however, involves the typical approach of looking at the 
backgrounds and experiences of individual politicians or at their 
rhetorical and other strategies. In neither answer do I suggest that we 
simply no longer have any great leaders. 
 Instead, I argue first that in an era of ``television politics,'' 
politicians have lost a great deal of control over the traditional 
``staging'' of the role of ``great leader.'' And second, I suggest that the 
centrality of television in today's politics has encouraged powerful elites 
to try to exercise even greater control over what types of politicians 
become visible to the public in the first place.  
 To develop the first answer, I focus on the ways in which 
television is different from other modes of communication and on 
how those differences interact with the role of ``great leader.'' In 
developing my second answer, I offer a case study to suggest that 
candidates who are not tied to powerful and wealthy elites have a 
difficult time gaining national media attention.  
_______________ 
Joshua Meyrowitz is Professor of Communication at the University of New 
Hampshire. This essay is adapted from a Keynote Address given at the Third 
Annual Media Studies Symposium at Sacred Heart University on November 3, 
1996. A more detailed version of the Agran campaign case study appears in the 
author's article, ``Visible and Invisible Candidates: A Case Study in 
`Competing Logics' of Campaign Coverage,'' Political Communication, 11, No. 
2 (1994), pp. 145-64. 
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 Our ``Crisis in Leadership'' 
 
 There has been a great deal of concern in the United States over 
the last thirty years with our ``crisis in leadership.'' President Lyndon 
Johnson abdicated his office. Richard Nixon resigned the presidency 
in disgrace. Gerald Ford's automatic succession to the presidency was 
later rejected by the electorate. Jimmy Carter's re-election bid ended in 
a landslide loss to Ronald Reagan. George Bush ended his one-term 
presidency seemingly out of touch with the people and challenged 
from within his own party. President Bill Clinton struggled through his 
first term with the public's perception that he is indecisive and 
untruthful. He went on to win reelection, but largely, it seemed, 
because the public was even less enthusiastic about his major 
opponent, Bob Dole. 
 Even Ronald Reagan, who served two full terms and is often 
considered our most popular recent president, was never fully able to 
escape the image of being an ``amiable dunce.'' Long before the 
Iran-Contra scandal tarnished Reagan's image further, polls suggested 
that while he was a ``likable person,'' many of the people who voted 
for him disagreed with his policies and did not rate him highly in ability 
or intelligence. 
 In short, we seem to be having difficulty finding leaders who have 
charisma and style and who are also competent, intelligent, and 
trustworthy. During the 1980 presidential election, Newsweek analyzed 
recent political polls and concluded that: ``Perhaps the most telling 
political finding of all is the high degree of disenchantment voters feel 
about most of the major candidates.'' If anything, the situation was even 
worse a dozen years later, when a New York Times/CBS poll 
indicated that more than 40% of those surveyed wished that other 
candidates had entered the race. In addition, the faith that there are 
other potentially better candidates is also eroding. The New York 
Times wrote in 1992 that while George Bush had no ``blueprints for 
the future'' of the United States, he also had little competition among 
the major presidential contenders or in Congress. Similarly, during the 
1996 campaign, Time magazine referred to President Clinton as ``the 
least worst candidate'' and the New York Times described him as 
``winning the Battle of the Lesser Evils.''  
 Every horse race has its winner, of course, and no matter how 
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uninspiring a field of candidates emerges, people will always have their 
favorites. In this sense, the typical analyses of which candidate won an 
election and why, as well as the news media's obsession with minor 
shifts in poll percentage points, only obscure the more fundamental 
issue of the overall decline in the image of leaders in general. 
 
 Television Demystifies 
 
 I suggest that the widespread use of television has a great deal to 
do with the decline in the prestige of leaders. Television has 
encouraged the perception that we know our leaders ``personally.'' 
This change diminishes the apparent mediating roles of political 
parties and journalists. Although this change sounds positive in the 
abstract, and may in fact be part of a beneficial and democratizing 
long-term trend, its most visible consequence at this time is an 
increasingly negative view of politicians on the part of the public and 
the press. 
 To be perceived as a ``great leader,'' one cannot simply be great, 
one must behave like a great person. Leadership, is not simply 
something an individual ``has.'' It is something that exists in specific 
interactions and rituals in specific social situations. Television has 
reduced the number of settings of greatness in our country. 
 Since every individual is, in some ways at least, ``ordinary,'' the 
performance of the role of ``greatness'' depends on distance and 
mystery. The need for a carefully staged and controlled performance is 
made clear in many ``training manuals'' for high-status positions. 
Balthasar Gracian, the seventeenth-century rector of the Jesuit College, 
for example, advised priests to ``Mix a little mystery with everything'' 
because mystery ``arouses veneration.'' Machiavelli offered similar 
advice and suggested that princes should carefully stage-manage their 
public appearances and emphasize certain personal traits while 
concealing others. 
 Before the widespread use of electronic media, the towns and 
cities of the country served as backstage areas of rehearsal and 
mystification for national political figures. The legendary oratory of 
politicians such as three-time presidential candidate William Jennings 
Bryan and the treasured images of many of our other political heroes 
were made possible by their ability to practice and modify their public 
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performances. Early mistakes could be limited to small forums, minor 
changes could be tested, and speeches and presentations could be 
honed to perfection. By the time Bryan delivered his powerful ``cross 
of gold'' speech to win the nomination for President at the 1896 
Democratic convention, for example, he had practiced the speech 
many times in different parts of the country. 
 A few well-turned phrases could once be used by politicians to 
thrill many different audiences on many different days. Bryan, for 
example, was very fond of his closing line in the 1896 speech (``You 
shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you 
shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold'') ─ so fond, in fact, that 
he had used it many times in other speeches and debates. In his 
memoirs, Bryan noted his early realization of the line's ``fitness for 
the conclusion of a climax,'' and after using it in smaller arenas, he 
``laid it away for a proper occasion.'' 
 Bryan's strategy now sounds charmingly old-fashioned. Today, 
through radio and television, wherever a national politician speaks, he 
or she addresses people all over the country. Major speeches, 
therefore, cannot be tested in advance. Because major speeches can be 
presented only once, they tend to be relatively coarse and undramatic. 
And inspiring lines ─ grist for the sound-bite mill ─ are either 
expended quickly or become relatively weak clichés. 
 National politicians could once tailor their talks to those physically 
present and buttress their central platforms with slightly different 
promises to different audiences. Today, because politicians address so 
many different types of people simultaneously via radio and television, 
they have greater difficulty speaking in specifics. If they make different 
promises when speaking in the midwest than when speaking in New 
York City, they appear cynical and manipulative to the mediated 
audiences. Yet if they make the same speeches everywhere, they seem 
bland and unimaginative, as well as ignorant of local issues and 
concerns. 
 With audiences in the millions, any slip of the tongue or 
ill-conceived phrase (such as Ross Perot's referring to a black audience 
as ``you people'' during the 1992 campaign, or Bill Clinton's infamous 
``but I didn't inhale'') or even an ill-advised gesture (such as George 
Bush glancing at his watch during a debate) is amplified in significance 
because millions of people have witnessed it. So wise politicians tend 
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to be very cautious ─ and thus rather boring ─ as they try to stick to a 
script devised with the help of their media advisors. 
 Many Americans are still hoping for the emergence of an old-style, 
dynamic ``great leader.'' Yet electronic media, particularly the highly 
exposing medium of television, are making it almost impossible for 
such leadership to manifest itself. There is no lack of potential leaders, 
but there is an overabundance of personal information about them. 
 The speaker's platform once lifted politicians up and away from 
average citizens, both literally and symbolically. In newspaper quotes 
and reports, the politician ─ as flesh and bones person ─ was 
completely absent. And on radio, politicians were disembodied voices. 
But the television camera now lowers politicians to the level of the 
common citizen and brings them close for our inspection. In recent 
years, we have seen our presidents sweat, stammer, and stumble ─ all 
in living color.  
 To be carried off smoothly, today's political performances 
requires what I have called a new ``middle region'' style: behavior that 
lacks the extreme formality of what sociologist Erving Goffman would 
call traditional ``front region'' or onstage behavior, but also lacks the 
extreme informality of what Goffman refers to as ``back region'' or 
backstage behavior.  
 Wise politicians try to make the most of the new political stage by 
matching their visible behaviors to the new, informal stage. They 
attempt to expose selected, positive aspects of their backstage lives in 
order to ingratiate themselves with the public: they appear on talk 
shows as ``ordinary people''; they push their families and feelings into 
the public arena; they field questions from children and average 
citizens; they admit some of their doubts and mistakes and marital 
problems; if they can, they play an instrument or sing with the band. 
They ``share'' with us. 
 Some politicians clearly succeed in the new public arena better 
than others. Yet there is a big difference between coping with the new 
situation and truly controlling it. Regardless of how well individual 
politicians adjust to the new exposure, the overall image of leaders has 
changed in the process. The new political performance remains a 
performance, but its style is markedly changed. And for both better 
and worse, the aura surrounding our leaders is diminished. 
 Presidential images were once much better protected. Before 
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television coverage of press conferences, newspapers were not even 
allowed to quote a president without his explicit permission. As late as 
the start of the Eisenhower administration in the 1950s, the New York 
Times and other publications had to paraphrase the President's 
answers to questions. In earlier administrations, journalists had to 
submit their questions in advance and were forbidden to mention 
which questions the President refused to answer. Presidential advisors 
frequently corrected presidents' answers during meetings with the 
press, and such assistance went unreported.  
 In the face of a ``crisis,'' our presidents once had many hours, 
sometimes even weeks or months, to consult with advisors and to 
formulate policy statements to be printed in newspapers. But now, 
standing before the nation, a president is often expected to have all 
relevant information in his head ─ without notes and without 
consultation with advisors. A president must often start a sentence 
before the end of the sentence is fully formed in his mind. Even a 
five-second pause for thought can seriously damage a leader's 
credibility. I believe that the apparent inarticulateness of all our recent 
presidents may be related more to the immediacy of television than to 
a decline in our leaders' mental or leadership abilities.  
 Television also differs from print in its basic form of information. 
In words, the titles ``President,'' ``Governor,'' ``Senator'' still call 
forth respect. But the close-up TV pictures of the persons filling those 
offices are rarely as impressive. We cannot help but notice the sweat 
on the brow, the nervous twitch, the bags under the eyes, or the excess 
makeup. 
 Television not only reduces our awe of politicians, it increases 
politicians' self-doubt and lowers self-esteem. A speaker's nervousness 
and mistakes usually are politely ignored by live audiences and 
therefore soon forgotten by the speaker as well. But with videotape, 
politicians have permanent records of themselves misspeaking or 
anxiously licking their lips. 
 For all these reasons, television may be a prime cause of the 
complaints of indecisive leadership that we have heard since the 
mid-1960s. 
 In the 1950s, many people were upset that a genuine hero, Dwight 
Eisenhower, felt the need to hire a Hollywood actor to help him with 
his television appearances. But we have become much more 
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sophisticated ─ and more cynical. We now know that one cannot 
simply be the President, but that one has to perform the role of 
``President.'' By 1980, it did not seem strange that a skilled actor had 
become President, with advisors to help him with the substantive 
aspects of his role.  
 Ironically, the new communication arena not only demands more 
control on the part of politicians, it also makes the attempts at control 
more visible. Again, the net effect is demystifying. Many citizens lived 
through twelve years of Franklin Roosevelt's presidency without being 
aware that his legs were crippled and that he often needed help to 
stand. But we are now constantly exposed to the ways in which our 
presidents and presidential candidates attempt to manipulate their 
images to create certain impressions and effects. 
 The result is that we no longer experience political performances 
as naive audiences. We have the perspective of stage hands who are 
aware of the constructed nature of the drama. Television provides 
what I call ``sidestage'' views of public figures. We watch politicians 
move from backstage to onstage to backstage. We see politicians 
address crowds of well-wishers, then greet their families ``in private.'' 
We join candidates as they speak with their advisors, and we sit behind 
them as they watch conventions on television. We see candidates 
address many different types of audiences in many different settings. 
Certainly, we prefer a good show to a bad show, but we are not fully 
taken in even by a great performance, because we are so aware of it 
being merely a ``performance.'' Instead, we are at best willingly 
entertained, charmed, courted, and seduced. Ironically, all the recent 
discussions of how we are being manipulated by politicians and their 
image makers may merely signify how visible and exposed the 
machinations now are. 
 The trend in media development over the last century has been 
toward increasing intimacy and revelation. From the portrait to the 
photograph to the movie to radio to the video close-up, media have 
been providing a closer, more replicative, more immediate image of 
our leaders. This trend has led to a blurring of the criteria used to 
evaluate private and public behaviors. 
 Private interactions have always been dominated by concrete 
appearance, gestures, and vocalization. The key questions in the 
personal realm is: ``What is the person like?'' But the public sphere 
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was once tied closely to the abstractions of language. The key question 
of the public realm once was: ``What has the person said, written, and 
accomplished?'' 
 We do not normally reject a potential lover or friend based on a 
poor résumé, and before television, voters had little opportunity to 
react negatively to national candidates because they were unpleasant to 
watch from a few feet away. But television has increasingly fostered the 
use of ``dating criteria'' over ``résumé criteria'' in the public sphere.  
 Television closeups simulate an interpersonal distance of about 
two feet. Even in real life, that is a distance of seduction or threat, not 
of rational discussion. When we are on a first date, for example, our 
impression of its success or failure relies relatively little on what our 
companion says. The words, ``What a nice meal'' or ``Thank you for 
a very pleasant time'' don't tell us much. So we search for other cues: 
How often does she look at me? How close to me is he standing? 
Does she seem nervous? Does he look bored? Similarly, television's 
sensuality makes language seem secondary.  
 Language certainly continues to play a role in television, but it is 
often overshadowed by the nonverbal. It is difficult to imagine 
someone reading a newspaper transcript of a speech by a politician he 
or she has never seen, and saying: ``Well, I disagree with that 
argument, that statement is false, and this sentence makes no sense at 
all. . . . But you know something, I really like the guy!'' Such a response 
would seem crazy. Yet this is the manner in which many viewers 
respond to politicians on television news. Therefore, even though we 
are clearly not oblivious to the words spoken on TV, we tend to react 
to them in an intimate context. Vice President Al Gore, for example, is 
an articulate speaker, but more attention has been paid to how ``stiff'' 
he appears on television than to anything he has ever said. Indeed, so 
much attention has been paid to Gore's stiffness, that he himself often 
feels obligated to joke about it in his speeches and talk show 
appearances. 
 Polls indicate that many citizens are now willing to vote for a 
national candidate with whom they disagree on the issues because they 
``personally like'' the candidate. (About a third of Ronald Reagan's 
votes in the 1980 election, for example, came from such 
``supporters.'') The reverse is also true: citizens hesitate to vote for a 
candidate whose positions are similar to their own if they do not 
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``like'' the candidate ``as a person.'' Such reactions grow out of the 
sense, fostered by television, that we have met and ``know'' our 
leaders personally.  
 So we seem to be evaluating potential presidents today by drawing 
partly on the type of criteria people use in choosing a sports teammate: 
it doesn't have to be someone who necessarily agrees with us on ``the 
issues of the day'' or someone we look up to as brilliant or heroic or as 
a moral giant, as long as we can tolerate spending time with them on a 
regular basis. Or put differently, presidential campaigns are now 
courtships to win a four-year close relationship with the public. 
 The new political context of television is both personalizing and 
demystifying. The results can be confusing ─ and uncomfortable ─ for 
both politician and viewer. When Richard Nixon died, for example, 
ABC chose to air, among other clips, Nixon's painfully awkward 
attempts to respond to a question by Barbara Walters that he was a 
cold and unemotional man. 
 On the one hand, there is something reassuring about these new, 
humanized images of our leaders. There is a measure of safety in them 
as well: as politicians appear more like ordinary people, we may be less 
likely to follow them blindly into an unnecessary war or other folly. But 
something is also lost. Although style and image play an important part 
in social relationships, they are severely limited as forms of public 
discourse. Extensive use of words is necessary if one wants to present 
linear arguments, suggest complex if-then relationships, and state 
propositions that can be proven true or false. One cannot explain 
social policy with a smile and wink. Observations of our leaders' good 
and bad hair days may be amusing, but they do little to improve the 
future of our republic. 
  Television also undermines traditional forms of political authority 
by giving us the sense that we directly witness events. Most of our 
information about other countries, for example, once came through 
the President and State Department, often after careful planning about 
how to present the information to the public. This allowed the 
government to appear to be in control of events and always to have a 
ready response. ``Official sources'' still shape many of the verbal 
narratives in news, but in many instances today, we experience events 
at the same moment as our leaders. The dramatic images of People 
Power in the Philippines, Chinese students protesting in Tiananmen 
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Square, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the war in Bosnia, massacres in 
Africa, and so on have been watched by the President, the Secretary of 
State, and millions of other Americans at the same moment. The same 
is true for many events within our own country. The immediacy of 
television often makes leaders appear to be ``standing on the 
sidelines'' rather than taking charge or reacting quickly. 
 As our leaders have lost much control over the flow of 
information ─ both about themselves and political events ─ they have 
mostly given up trying to behave like the imperial leaders of the past. 
We now have politicians who strive to act more like the person next 
door, just as our real neighbors seem more worldly and demand to 
have a greater say in national and international affairs. 
 What is clear is that the current drive toward intimacy with our 
leaders involves a fundamental paradox. In pursuing our desire to be 
``close'' to great people or to confirm their greatness through closer 
scrutiny, we often destroy their ability to function as great people. 
Much human activity is common to all individuals. If high-status 
persons cannot segregate such behavior from their onstage high-status 
performances, then they appear to be more like everyone else. By 
providing greater access to, and awareness of, backstage behavior, 
television tends to undermine traditional abstractions of status. 
 ``Greatness'' manifests itself in the onstage performance and, by 
definition, in its isolation from backstage behaviors. Yet when we say 
that we want to see what authorities are ``really like,'' we generally 
mean we want to see what they are least like, that is, both how they 
behave least often in the role they hope to perform for us, and also the 
least they can be in social terms. In intimate spheres, people are often 
much alike: they eat, they eliminate, they get tired, they sleep, they 
make love, they lose their tempers, they groom, they indulge in whims 
and self-involvements. 
 There is, therefore, an inherent ``vanishing truth'' paradox in the 
use of television to give us a close-up view of our politicians and other 
authorities. When we see our leaders in varieties of situations and 
locations, when we observe them as they respond to spontaneous 
interviews or as they grow weary from a day of work or campaigning, 
we do not simply learn more about them. By searching behind the 
fronts of performers, we also diminish the roles that can be performed 
and perceived. Few of our past ``great leaders'' would fare very well if 
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they lived in our current media environment. 
 On television, our politicians feel driven to be intimate with us, but 
then they wake up to discover that we don't respect them in the 
morning. We have seen too much of them to remain enchanted by 
them. One reason the public is no longer in awe of politicians, 
therefore, is that television has made it difficult for political leaders to 
perform traditional roles of ``greatness.'' 
 
 Limited Knowledge 
 
 But there is another fundamental reason for disenchantment, and 
this one is much less visible. Rather than focusing on our seeing too 
much, the second reason highlights how little we still know. We are 
told too little about significant issues, and we are barred from learning 
about candidates and potential candidates who might be willing to talk 
about those issues. 
 The personal, intimate views of politicians on TV alter the 
structure and logic of the political process. The party's function as a 
mediator between candidate and voter, for example, is dramatically 
undermined by media that give us an increasing sense that we have 
``met'' and ``know'' our leaders personally. Newspaper endorsements 
have also lost much of their influence. Why should we leave it to 
others to tell us what to think about candidates when we can judge 
them for ourselves? But the major parties and the press are still very 
powerful in telling the public who the ``major'' candidates are in the 
first place. We are asked by both the parties and our news media to 
forget about the possibility of other candidates.  
 Ross Perot brought this issue to the public's attention during the 
1996 campaign, which led Larry King to include him and then other 
candidates in his CNN television program after the debates. 
Ambassador Alan Keyes's exclusion from a debate (after his inclusion 
in earlier forums) also brought some attention to this issue. 
 But the public remains generally unaware of how serious the 
situation is, and how even experienced candidates of the two major 
parties are systematically excluded from news coverage and ballot 
access. To make this point, I'll focus in the rest of this essay on a case 
study about a particular presidential candidate during the 1992 
campaign who had difficulty getting any national press attention. The 
11
Meyrowitz: TV Politics: Seeing More than We Want, Knowing Less than We Need
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 1997
 JOSHUA MEYROWITZ 
 
26 
real question that emerges from this case study, however, is not who is 
running in a particular year and not getting coverage, but how many 
other candidates have not even bothered to run at all because of the 
predictable pattern of media exclusion. 
 On August 22, 1991 Larry Agran launched his campaign for the 
presidency from his home town of Irvine, in Orange County, 
California. Agran's announcement speech offered a detailed plan for a 
``New American Security'' that put ``human need at home ahead of 
military overkill abroad.'' That same day, the Orange County edition of 
the Los Angeles Times carried a 1200-word story on the 
announcement on the first page of Section B, with part of the headline 
reading: ``He May Not Win, but He Vows to Make Voice of 
Liberalism Heard.'' Several follow-up articles appeared in the Orange 
County edition the next day, including one titled ``Why Agran Could 
Be a Primary Figure.'' But the main edition of the Los Angeles Times, 
which is distributed nationally, was less encouraging. It carried only 
one brief, 300-word story on the announcement, referring to 
Democrat Agran's quest as ``the longest-shot candidacy of all'' within a 
party that had only a long shot chance of winning the White House in 
the first place. The story ran on page 46, the obituary page. 
 Thus, the general pattern that would repeat itself throughout the 
campaign was established early: respectful coverage in the local media 
(which have relatively little national political impact), contrasted with 
marginalized national coverage that suggested that the Agran campaign 
was ``dead on arrival.'' 
 In September 1991, Larry Agran was one of only two declared 
U.S. presidential candidates at the Sioux City Democratic Party Unity 
Dinner. This was to be the first Democratic party event of the 
presidential campaign season, and Agran, the other declared candidate 
(former Senator Paul Tsongas), and several potential candidates spoke 
there to an audience of 500 Democrats. A fleeting image that appeared 
on Cable News Network showed Agran being greeted by Paul 
Tsongas, Senator Tom Harkin, and Governor Bill Clinton. But when 
the same encounter appeared in an Associated Press photo published 
by the lasting ``newspaper of record,'' the New York Times, Agran 
was nowhere to be seen. Paul Tsongas and Tom Harkin are seen 
speaking and gesturing to some unseen person beyond the right 
margin of the photograph. This is a good visual metaphor for Agran's 
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campaign experience and the experience of most other so-called 
``minor'' candidates. 
 Over the early weeks and months of the presidential campaign, as 
other well-known politicians declared their candidacies, the national 
press spent a considerable amount of time on them. The national 
media also speculated at length about the hypothetical entries of two 
prominent non-candidates ─ the Rev. Jesse Jackson and New York 
Governor Mario Cuomo. But the real and ongoing Agran campaign 
received little or no attention. In the rare instances when his name did 
appear, he was described as a ``dark horse,'' a ``fringe candidate,'' 
``the longest of longshots,'' or ``an obscure contender'' (without any 
acknowledgment by journalists that the paucity of their own coverage 
of Agran might be contributing to his ``obscurity'').  
 Agran was barred from most of the televised debates on the basis 
of criteria that shifted as he tried to meet them. When he was allowed 
to participate in forums with the so-called ``major'' candidates, he was 
often left out of news reports of the events or was asked by press 
photographers to move aside. If he was scheduled to speak last, the 
press usually left before his speech, and was not there to hear or report 
on what he said or on the audience reaction. Agran would hold press 
conferences, and few if any journalists would attend, and fewer still 
news reports would appear. With Catch-22 logic, Agran was told by 
news media executives that he had not earned the right to media 
exposure, because, among other things, he had not received enough 
media exposure.  
 To be fair to those making such news judgments, thirty-six 
candidates entered the Democratic race in New Hampshire. Further, 
much of Agran's dark-horse status derived from his unconventional 
credentials as a presidential contender. Although he is a Harvard Law 
School graduate and published author who has devoted twenty years to 
public service, he has never held statewide or national office. He 
served for twelve years as an elected official in Irvine, California, 
America's largest master-planned city. Most national journalists I spoke 
with dismissed him based on his having held only local office. Of 
course, there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that bars a local 
official from running for the presidency. Further, the national media's 
conceptions of what makes for a viable candidate are arbitrary and 
changeable. For example, until recently the major media would have 
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dismissed anyone who was ``only'' a Congressmen (who represents a 
local district rather than a state) or was ``only'' a former Senator or 
Governor. In 1992, Agran's status as a former mayor did not meet the 
unstated criteria held by most national journalists. As journalist Roger 
Mudd put it at the start of a rare TV interview with Agran: ``It does 
stretch credulity to think that a Jewish ex-mayor of a small suburban 
California town can make it.'' 
 Agran's supporters, of course, took a different view. They pointed 
out that, as Irvine's first directly elected mayor, Agran received national 
acclaim (including significant media attention) for the numerous 
progressive programs he had initiated, including elderly housing, 
childcare, mass transportation, one of the nation's first curbside 
recycling programs, preservation of undeveloped land, and hazardous 
waste regulations. They noted that, as Executive Director of the Center 
for Innovative Diplomacy (a foreign policy think tank), Agran played a 
unique role as a ``global mayor,'' who pursued issues of international 
trade, arms reduction, and human rights, and earned his city a United 
Nations award for his pioneering legislation to eliminate 
ozone-depleting compounds ─ all from an unlikely base in deeply 
conservative Orange Country. (Orange County had given Reagan and 
Bush one of their largest voting margins in the country.) Agran's 
supporters described him as the most articulate presidential contender 
with the boldest and most specific blueprint for shifting cold war 
military spending to post-cold war domestic needs. Agran, they argued, 
had much more governing experience than Pat Buchanan and Ross 
Perot put together, and more foreign policy experience than Bill 
Clinton had at that time. They also claimed that the public's reaction to 
many of Agran's appearances was so positive that his ideas deserved to 
be heard ─ and allowed to influence the platforms of the ``major'' 
candidates ─ even if Agran himself had little chance of winning the 
nomination. And they argued that, regardless of anything else, since 
Agran's campaign had achieved access to about forty primary and 
caucus ballots, the public deserved to be told something about him so 
as to be able to make an informed choice in the voting booth. 
(Ironically, Agran would have been on many more that 40 ballots had 
not the other states required ``significant press attention'' as one of the 
criteria of ballot inclusion.) 
 Of course, it is no surprise that Agran's supporters saw more in 
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him than did most national journalists. What is surprising, however, is 
the extent to which Agran's campaign received encouragement from 
the coverage of the local New Hampshire press reporting on the 
first-in-the nation primary, as well as from at least two nationally-known 
columnists, Colman McCarthy and Sydney Schanberg. In New 
Hampshire, there were dozens of newspaper articles, editorials, 
columns, and letters to the editor, which described Agran's exclusion 
and/or supported his right to be heard in national debates. Sample 
headlines ran: ``Larry Agran Deserves a Place in Democratic Primary 
Debates''; ``He's Out with the in-Crowd''; ``Unlock the Process''; and 
``At Least Give Agran a Chance to Lose.'' Beyond New Hampshire, 
McCarthy and Schanberg both wrote columns challenging Agran's 
designation as a ``minor candidate'' and endorsing his right to be 
heard and seen through debates and national news coverage. 
 Yet most of the rest of the mainstream national press rejected 
Agran before a single vote was cast or any voter poll was taken. The 
national press placed him in the same category with candidates who 
merely paid $1,000 to be put on one ballot, in New Hampshire, and 
had little else in the way of background, experience, or campaign. 
Those candidates with whom Agran was functionally grouped included 
a recovering alcoholic and drug addict and the bicycle-riding candidate 
who proposed having sheep and goats tend to the front lawn of the 
White House. 
 My purpose here is not to emphasize Larry Agran or to endorse 
him for President, but rather to analyze the coverage and non-coverage 
of the Agran campaign for what it tells us about U.S. presidential 
campaign coverage in general. Agran's unusual status ─ as ``less than a 
`major' candidate'' but ``more than a `fringe' candidate'' ─ helps to 
make some of the implicit journalistic decisions about campaign 
coverage more visible. Agran's anomalous status as a candidate makes 
his campaign experiences a good lens through which to see aspects of 
political campaign coverage that normally remain invisible. 
 To his dismay, Agran found that for him one of the rules of the 
campaign was: ``To get press coverage, you must be disruptive.'' 
When he was barred by the Chairman of the State Democratic Party 
from a televised Health Care Forum with presidential candidates in 
Nashua, New Hampshire, for example, the normally soft-spoken 
Agran stood up in the audience and demanded by what criteria he was 
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being excluded. Responding to a signal from a state party official, 
security police began to remove Agran from the hall, but the crowd's 
shouts of ``Freedom of speech!'' and ``Let us vote!'' embarrassed the 
men at the dais into inviting him to join them. (Another largely 
uncovered candidate, the New Alliance Party's Lenora Fulani, who was 
running in the New Hampshire primary as a Democrat, also took this 
opportunity to join the other candidates.) Agran's confrontation with 
party officials and his subsequent inclusion in the health forum was his 
first widely reported ``campaign event'' ─ but little mention was made 
of his innovative proposals for health care reform.  
 To prevent this sort of public call for inclusion from occurring 
again (the State party chair called it ``intimidation''), the next state 
Democratic party debate was moved to a high-security TV studio ─ 
with no audience permitted. Agran stood outside, among a crowd of 
four hundred people, who braved zero-degree temperatures to protest 
the exclusion of their candidates from the debates. (Most of the 
protesters were supporters of Lenora Fulani, but several other 
``fringe'' candidates were also represented.) As reported in the local 
New Hampshire press, the protest offered many dramatic moments, 
with the ``major'' candidates forced to pass ``picket lines for 
democracy'' as protestors shouted ``Scab! Scab! Scab!'' Yet perhaps 
because there was no violence and the event inside the studio was not 
interrupted, the protest received almost no attention in the national 
media. 
 Agran and his staff believed that at some point local press 
attention would build into national exposure. But several reporters and 
editors at national newspapers and magazines that I spoke with 
admitted that the longer one has not covered a candidate, the harder it 
becomes to do so. ``The obvious question in such situations,'' said 
Alvin Sanoff, a senior editor at U.S. News & World Report, ``is 
`Where have you been that you just discovered this person?' '' He also 
noted that ``it's always safer to stay with the pack and be wrong, than 
to risk going out on a limb and covering someone who then turns out 
to not be that important.'' 
 When local press coverage and protests had no impact on his 
national media profile, Agran's campaign staff became convinced that 
his status as a ``fringe'' candidate could be erased if he tied or passed 
one or more of the ``major'' candidates in the polls. They were wrong.  
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 When Agran made his first measurable showing in a University of 
New Hampshire/WMUR-TV poll taken from January 6 to 11, the 
Associated Press story on the poll grouped Agran's results into a total 
score for ``minor candidates and write-ins,'' without mentioning his 
name. (In my local paper, the headline conveyed the story's focus: 
``Clinton Still Making Great Strides in Primary Polls.'') When a 
January 22 poll, conducted by the American Research Group (ARG), 
showed Agran tied with former California Governor Jerry Brown and 
Iowa Senator Tom Harkin, the polling group's press release suggested 
three headlines, including ``Agran Appears in Democratic Race.'' But 
the AP buried Agran's result in a single sentence two-thirds of the way 
through a story focusing on Clinton as the front-runner. (In New 
Hampshire's Union Leader the headline read: ``Polls Show Clinton 
Ahead of President and the Democrats.'') When a follow-up ARG poll 
showed Agran doubling his support and moving ahead of Brown, the 
AP again focused on Clinton, but this time on the drop in his rating. 
(In the New York Times, the headline read: ``Clinton Rating Falls in 
Poll.''). Agran's tally was reported much further down in the story (after 
Brown's lower score), and it was incorrectly referred to as Agran's 
``first measurable showing in the poll.'' When the next ARG poll 
showed Agran still between Brown and Harkin, ABC's World News 
Sunday ─ perhaps to avoid the complexity of explaining the identity of 
a candidate they had not been covering ─ simply dropped Agran's tally 
from the middle of the reported poll results! Harkin's score was 
followed directly by Brown's. This was crude and outrageous, of 
course, and other major news organizations found a subtler way to 
avoid the ``problem'' of skipping over a higher score to report a lower 
one: they reported only on the top three names. 
 During the campaign Bill Clinton and his staff complained bitterly 
about the aggressive press coverage Clinton received. But when seen in 
a larger perspective, a different story emerges: the intensity of the focus 
on Clinton, whether positive or negative in tone, generally worked to 
his benefit ─ by keeping the spotlight on him, by allowing him to claim 
that he had weathered brutal press coverage to become the 
``comeback kid,'' and, most important, by obscuring the existence of 
credible alternatives. 
 Agran, however, refused to disappear. His unusual appearance 
with four of the so-called ``major candidates'' at the U.S. Conference 
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of Mayors in January led to the first significant mention of his 
campaign in the New York Times, which in effect declared him the 
winner of the debate. The Times reported: ``After hearing pitches 
from the Democratic Presidential contenders on how they would 
revive America's cities, dozens of mayors meeting here today seemed 
to agree on one thing: the single candidate who truly understands 
urban needs is Larry Agran.'' Agran was mentioned in passing in 
several other newspaper reports on the conference. Yet the Associated 
Press, ABC radio news, and the All News Channel, along with the 
other television reports I saw on the forum, did not even mention that 
Agran was there. 
 Similarly, when Agran participated with the ``major'' candidates in 
the Global Warming Leadership Forum in February, conference 
organizer Carole Florman told me that the audience was ``very 
enthusiastic about Larry Agran and less than enthusiastic about Bill 
Clinton and Bob Kerrey.'' Yet all the major national news organizations 
covering the event ─ ABC News, CBS News (through a local affiliate), 
and the AP ─ omitted all mention of Agran from their reports. 
 Agran's tying or passing well-known candidates in several polls and 
outperforming them at two forums ─ all within a ten-day period ─ 
could have been seen as a ``major story'' by the national news media. 
But that story was never constructed and told. 
 As the pattern of exclusion from national coverage built, there 
seemed to be nothing that Agran could do to register with the national 
media. Press language even excluded evidence of his and other 
``minor'' candidates' existence. A TV news program would report: 
``Four out of the five Democratic presidential candidates were in 
Manchester, New Hampshire today,'' as if there were no other 
candidates. Or, a report would say: ``Bill Clinton spoke in Nashua, 
New Hampshire today. The rest of the candidates were in other states'' 
─ while Agran was very much in New Hampshire and actively 
campaigning. 
  We see this same pattern in the reporting of the February 23 
South Dakota debate, which had long been scheduled to include 
Agran. Agran gained an additional boost on the eve of the debate with 
an endorsement for the presidency by the local Lakota Times (a 
Native American paper). Yet when reporting on the eve of the unusual 
debate with a sixth candidate, Larry Agran, NBC Nightly News 
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reported ``All five Democrats are in South Dakota for a debate'' 
(emphasis added). 
 Agran's strong performance in the South Dakota debate 
(especially his effective attacks on Jerry Brown for being only a very 
recent convert with respect to campaign finance reform) led to the 
most simultaneous national attention he had received at any point 
during his campaign. Agran's participation was featured late that night 
on some TV news programs (the debates took place after the evening 
news programs had aired), including CNN Headline News. The next 
day's Los Angeles Times called him ``the showstopper of the 
evening,'' and the Boston Globe wrote ``One of the surprises of the 
debate was the solid performance turned in by Larry Agran.'' The 
same Globe reporter filed an article exclusively on Agran's 
performance at the debate titled ``Larry Agran: `Winner' in Debate 
with Little Chance for the Big Prize.'' The Washington Post and the 
New York Times also reported on his participation. But by the day 
after the debate, his presence at the forum began to fade from national 
television. Of the nine reports on the debate on the network morning 
news shows, only three mentioned his participation. By that evening, 
he was gone. NBC Nightly News, which had mentioned only five 
participants the night before, did not correct the number of 
participants and showed video only of Clinton speaking briefly, 
following by a clip of Harkin and Tsongas clashing at the debate. 
ABC's World News Tonight featured the same clash between Harkin 
and Tsongas. The CBS Evening News mentioned the South Dakota 
primary, but had no report on the debate. 
 By the end of March 1992, Douglass Wilder, Tom Harkin, Bob 
Kerrey, and Paul Tsongas had all suspended their campaigns. But the 
narrowed Democratic field did not generate any increased attention to 
Agran. After being ignored by the press for so long, there seemed to 
be nothing Agran could do to register with the national media. Even 
when Agran garnered more voter signatures to be placed on the New 
York ballot than Jerry Brown, only Brown was allowed to participate in 
New York City debates with Bill Clinton.  
 At the start of one debate at Lehman College in the Bronx on the 
topic of urban problems ─ Agran's specialty ─ the hapless candidate 
stood up and said ``I respectfully ask to be included in this forum.'' 
Agran was quickly tackled to the floor by plain clothes police, dragged 
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down a flight of stairs head first, handcuffed, thrown into a police 
paddy wagon until the debate was over, and then kept in custody at a 
Bronx jail for four hours. He was booked on charges of disorderly 
conduct, trespassing, and resisting arrest. Agran's New York City 
campaign manager, who had been sitting next to Agran, was also 
arrested. The TV cameras did not even turn away from the debate 
stage to focus on any of this drama. 
 Agran's arrest received some coverage in New York, including a 
brief mention in the New York Times (in the context of how the 
extensive security at the debate had somehow not prevented this 
disturbance). And Agran's home-state paper, the Los Angeles Times, 
condemned the arrest in an editorial, saying that ``something's weird 
when the former mayor of perhaps the most orderly city in the country 
is busted for disorderly conduct in the most disorderly city in 
America.'' But beyond that, there was largely silence. (The New York 
Post could claim to have ``covered it,''in both senses of the word, 
reporting: ``Two men were arrested inside the Lehman College 
auditorium when they started heckling the candidates, according to 
police.'')  
 One criterion for coverage that journalists cited when I spoke to 
them early in the campaign was federal matching funds. Agran, they 
told me, would be unable to qualify. But when Agran, without any 
significant press coverage, did eventually qualify for federal matching 
funds in mid-May ─ only the tenth candidate from all parties to do so 
─ there was virtually no press mention of this, and no change in the 
attention level he received. (The Washington Post, for example, 
dutifully reported on the ``official'' news of the gaining of federal 
funds, but the paper described him as a ``winless candidate'' who had 
to be in New York during the Democratic Convention for another 
reason: to face charges from a recent arrest.) 
 Agran did not win his party's nomination. But he did receive a few 
delegate votes at the convention. They were listed on the TV screens 
as votes for ``Other.'' 
 Agran's trial for requesting inclusion in the Bronx, New York 
debate was delayed several times, and he remained under threat of 
imprisonment for ten months. All charges were finally dismissed on 
January 19, 1993. (But after New York City successfully appealed the 
expiration of their time to appeal, Agran was dragged into court again 
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in 1996. Once more, a judge ruled in his favor. Agran countersued, 
but he was barred by the judge in that trial from including any of the 
details of his campaign experience, described here, and a jury found 
ruled against him.) In spite of Agran's efforts to draw press attention to 
his legal woes and their implications for an open political system, 
neither the prolonged court proceedings nor the dismissals received 
any significant news coverage. 
 By some measures at least, Agran's seventeen months of struggling 
to be heard were filled with many ``newsworthy events.'' Yet the 
national news media mostly ignored him. A computer search through 
the Nexis system, for example, reveals that Agran's name did not 
appear even once in the campaign stories of the major news 
magazines, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report. 
Between August 1, 1991 and December 7, 1992, Agran was 
mentioned in 567 stories listed by Nexis (many of these were 
redundant references in similar stories in different editions of the same 
newspaper or different versions of the same wire release, or 
non-campaign stories from the Orange County edition of the Los 
Angeles Times). In contrast, during the same period, the number of 
citations for some of the other candidates were: 4,527 for Wilder, 
7,025 for Kerrey, 7,615 for Harkin, 9,266 for Buchanan, 11,476 for 
Tsongas, and 14,288 for Brown. The search for Clinton citations was 
halted at 82,229. 
 
 During and after the campaign, I spoke with a number of national 
journalists at the Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, the Boston 
Globe, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report, NBC News, 
Nightline, and other places. They all expressed little surprise over the 
press treatment that Agran received, and they offered similar 
explanations for it. Tom Rosenstiel, for example, who at the time 
wrote on media and politics for the Los Angeles Times, suggested that 
there are several reasons. For one thing, political reporters tend to 
cover those candidates who their sources, the party professionals, tell 
them are the ``major candidates.'' Reporters ask them: What are you 
hearing?, Who is lining up endorsements? Who is doing fundraisers 
for whom? ``This year, especially,'' said Rosenstiel, ``the last thing the 
Democratic leaders want is to have attention paid to someone like 
Larry Agran, which would reinforce the impression that they are 
21
Meyrowitz: TV Politics: Seeing More than We Want, Knowing Less than We Need
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 1997
 JOSHUA MEYROWITZ 
 
36 
putting forward a `field of unknowns.' '' 
  Secondly, said Rosenstiel, it is difficult and expensive and 
confusing for the media to have to contend with a lot of candidates. 
``Journalists don't sit around in newsrooms asking `Whom else 
should we cover?' The big question is `Whom can we stop covering?' '' 
An election, said Rosenstiel, ``is not a matter of who is the smartest, 
the most articulate, or who has the best ideas. . . . What it really comes 
down to is who can win the most votes.'' Ultimately, Rosenstiel noted, 
``if we think someone is not likely to win, then we don't think of them 
as someone to devote much time to.''  
 Journalists also look to each other to see who is being taken as a 
``serious'' candidate. Bill Wheatley of NBC News, which excluded 
Agran from its televised debate, told me that press coverage was 
``certainly one of the factors.'' He continued: ``A number of 
independent news organizations had made that judgment to exclude 
Agran. It's not a conspiracy. One needs to pay attention to one's 
colleagues' decisions.'' Yet while Wheatley saw press decisions as 
``independent,'' he admitted that ``journalistic consensus in part 
reflects consensus of party professionals who have some experience 
knowing who is electable.''  
 Similarly, Alvin Sanoff, Senior Editor at U.S. News and World 
Report, told me: ``Journalists all talk to the same people, the same 
readers of tea leaves. We have similar kinds of input from similar 
sources. It takes a leap of faith to say, `we're missing the story.' 
. . . We all read and talk to each other. We speak to similar experts 
and gurus and poll takers. We're influenced by the same influences.'' 
 New York Times reporter Betsy Kolbert told me that reporters 
there felt queasy about what she referred to as ``the Agran call,'' that 
is, the implicit, collective decision not to cover his campaign. This news 
judgment, however, had nothing to do with what the reporters thought 
the public's reaction to Agran would be. ``The public would have 
loved him,'' Kolbert told me, ``he was so different.'' But once Agran 
was excluded from ``the consensus,'' there was little he could do to 
register with the national media.  
 
 The Origins of National Journalistic Logic 
 
 Without national coverage, of course, a presidential campaign is 
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doomed, regardless of local coverage and local public reaction. I have 
no space here to analyze all the factors that I believe contributed to the 
national journalistic consensus to exclude Agran (contrasted with the 
relatively respectful local press coverage that he received). But I will 
briefly list ten of them. 
 
 1. Limited resources for gathering news within each organization 
(made worse in 1992 by a bad economy) and limited news space/time 
(made worse during this campaign by the decline in ad revenues) led to 
a logical attempt to narrow the field of candidates.  
 
 2. National journalists' reliance on ``official sources'' for 
definitions of what and who are ``news,'' for a general ``informed 
perspective,'' for ``objective reporting,'' and for feedback on their 
reporting, led the national media to define ``major'' candidates in 
relation to what party officials believed ─ and wanted the press to 
report ─ rather than in relation to the potential response to candidates 
on the part of the public.  
 
 3. The significant influence of centralized news organizations 
allowed a relatively small number of decision-makers to shape the 
general patterns of coverage for over 200 million citizens. Decisions 
made at the New York Times and the Washington Post affected the 
reporting of every other national news organization. Similarly, network 
TV decisions affected local TV coverage, and the national Associated 
Press, for example, guided the local AP coverage.  
 
 4. National journalists' herd instincts (``pack journalism'') led 
journalists to move into even greater synchrony with each other in 
terms of who was and was not covered, as well as the general style of 
coverage. Since this synchrony was not the result of an explicit 
conspiracy, it was viewed as ``the one correct way to cover the 
campaign,'' as evidenced by the seemingly independent judgment of 
many different journalists. 
 
 5. Conventional definitions of ``objectivity'' restricted coverage to 
the ``major'' candidates. Since authoritative sources (and other news 
media) were not identifying Agran as a ``major'' candidate, for 
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example, journalists perceived the idea of giving his campaign 
significant coverage as a form of non-objective promotion of his 
candidacy. 
 
 6. Journalists' desire to hide the arbitrariness of news judgments 
and the potential impact of such judgments on the outcome of 
campaigns (``We don't make the news, we just report it'') led them to 
stick with their initial decisions not to give much coverage to Agran ─ 
regardless of what happened later. (To my mind, this also explains why 
journalists felt they had to cover no-party candidate Ross Perot as soon 
as he hinted that he might enter the race. Since billionaire Perot had 
the money to buy direct access to the public through the media, not 
covering him would make the public aware of the media as ``censors.'' 
In contrast, true third-party candidates, such as Lenora Fulani of the 
New Alliance Party and Libertarian Andre Marrou, were virtually 
ignored by the news media and were excluded from the 
nationally-televised debates.) The journalists I interviewed were very 
hesitant to share with the public the reasoning they used in deciding 
how to cover candidates as well as which candidates not to cover. 
 
 7. Journalists' desire for ``prestige assignments'' led them to focus 
on ``the stars.'' Covering the candidates most likely to reach the 
highest levels of power lays the groundwork for journalists to have 
good ``access to authoritative sources,'' a wise career strategy. (From 
the very beginning, the Clinton campaign was seen as the premiere 
assignment, which led to both more positive and more negative 
coverage of Clinton as the campaign proceeded.) 
 
 8. The primacy of television in the campaign lent weight to criteria 
that made sense to commercial TV network executives, such as 
keeping the debates short (so as not to lose too much commercial 
time), and limiting the debates to celebrity candidates being 
interviewed by celebrity journalists (in order to enhance network 
prestige and maximize ratings and viewer flow-through to subsequent 
commercial programs). 
 
 9. Journalists' patronizing attitudes about the public's intelligence 
and attention span made them concerned about keeping the 
24
Sacred Heart University Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/shureview/vol17/iss1/2
 TV POLITICS 
 
 39 
``campaign story'' and possible outcomes as simple as possible. 
 
 10. Non-campaign season news conventions limit the range of 
voices that are viewed as legitimate during campaigns. (The highly 
selective range of typical news narratives fosters the perception that 
only candidates who discuss domestic and foreign policy within those 
narrative frames are ``reasonable'' and ``serious'' and ``moderate'' 
enough to be elected. One typical narrative within the U.S. press with 
regard to foreign aid, for example, involves the debate over ``how 
much the U.S. should spend to promote democracy in other 
countries.'' There is little questioning of whether that is indeed what the 
money is intended to do. Thus, Agran's plan to end all foreign military 
aid because it has typically gone to support dictators, and his suggestion 
to offer foreign ``people aid'' instead, did not fit easily into a familiar 
mainstream press narrative and made him seem radical, non-serious, 
and fringy.'') 
 
 All these factors conspired to keep Agran in the shadows of 
national coverage. (Most of these factors are linked to issues of power 
in Washington and New York, and they therefore had less influence 
on the reporting of the local press. So while we often think of the local 
press as inferior to the national media, one could make the opposite 
case according to these criteria.) 
 In short, these influences and others shape a national journalistic 
logic that fosters a relatively closed frame for campaign reporting that is 
only slightly sensitive to high degrees of public dissatisfaction with the 
``system'' and with ``major'' candidates.  
 
 Conclusion 
 
 Television exposure certainly demystifies those politicians we see 
frequently. But the sense that we see so much ─ even too much ─ is 
deceptive. The exposure of visible politicians distracts us from realizing 
how little we really know about crucial social issues and other potential 
leaders. 
 The 1992 U.S. presidential election stood out for the un-
precedented level of voter dissatisfaction with politics as usual. Polls 
showed disenchantment with both parties and with all the so-called 
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``major'' candidates. Voters expressed the wish that other candidates 
had entered the race. The press dutifully reported on these polls (and 
on some of the lies and the shortcomings of each of the major 
candidates.) But a truly responsive democratic press would go further. 
It would widen the spotlight beyond the centerstage that is the subject 
of public discontent. The 1992 election was also the first to follow the 
revolutions in Eastern Europe that swept traditional leadership aside 
and brought to power those who had once inhabited the political 
margins, even jail cells. The U.S. press generally applauded these 
changes and saw them as movements toward ``our way of life.'' Yet 
there is little indication that the U.S. press is willing to expand U.S. 
democracy by widening its coverage. 
 My approach here is distinct from that of James Fallows, who has 
argued that a cynical press is ruining public discourse. Although I think 
Fallows' bold and important work is correct in describing how the 
press typically reports on campaigns, I think he is off the mark on two 
issues. First, I see the press behavior as a reaction to the intimate, 
demystifying setting of TV, not creating this demystification. (Large 
segments of the public were disgusted with LBJ and Nixon, while the 
press was still very respectful to them.) Second, as the Agran case study 
suggests, the press, with all its surface cynicism, still remains too much 
in awe of the powerful to expand the spotlight of media politics to 
include a broader range of ideas and candidates. Even as the press is 
currently condemning politicians for engaging in questionable 
campaign fundraising practices, the press is failing to examine its own 
practice of largely ignoring candidates who do not have large campaign 
``war chests.'' Candidates who are not backed by the wealthy and the 
powerful are rarely evaluated by the major media on the basis of their 
stands on the issues. Instead they are viewed as ``spoilers'' of the 
aspirations of the so-called ``major'' candidates. 
 NBC's Bill Wheatley is partly right. There is no conspiracy. No 
conspiracy is necessary to reach general consistency of thought and 
action if journalists come to the situation with similar training, follow 
similar routines, interact with the same sources and with each other, 
and monitor each other's judgments. Through typical national press 
routines, incestuous and intersubjective judgments among a cluster of 
elite decision-makers (party officials, news executives, and debate 
organizers) take on the aura of objective reality.  
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 Press judgments are based on an internal logic that makes 
journalistic practices seem reasonable and safe for democracy. Yet this 
case study suggests that current national journalistic practice serves as a 
form of political censorship that may not be in the public interest. A 
presidential candidate who was shot or tortured by another country's 
secret police, would become a cause célèbre. But Agran and other 
candidates, though physically unharmed, have been much more 
effectively silenced. They have been dubbed ``not newsworthy.'' And 
each decision not to cover them is used as another justification to push 
them further into the dark hole on non-news. There they and their 
plans for the country join many other throwaway citizens and many 
other throwaway ideas. 
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